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	Internal
    Computer Investigations 
	By John Patzakis and
  Victor Limongelli 
   � � Introduction
  
	In response to a wave
  of high-profile corporate crime such as the Enron debacle, [ii]
  Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“Sarbanes-Oxley”), and
  President Bush signed the act into law on July 30, 2002.�
  Sarbanes-Oxley was enacted to protect investors by combating corporate
  crime and improving corporate governance. [iii]
  �As many commentators have noted,
  Sarbanes-Oxley requires companies to implement extensive corporate governance
  policies to prevent and timely respond to fraudulent activity within the
  company. [iv]�
  For example, Sarbanes-Oxley expressly requires publicly traded
  companies to create anonymous hotlines for the reporting of fraud, and it
  requires executives to certify that their financial statements are accurate.�
   
   
   
	These and other
  provisions require companies to closely review their policies and procedures
  regarding internal investigations, and implement the necessary processes and
  tools to respond timely and effectively to reports of fraudulent activity.�
  With the vast majority of information now generated in digital format, [v]
  the recovery and analysis of digital data is the primary process for internal
  corporate investigations. In other words, for effective self-policing,
  including the timely detection and response to reports of fraudulent activity,
  companies must have the ability to acquire, search and preserve electronic
  data related to fraudulent activity.  
   
   
	Many companies,
  however, are ill-equipped to acquire the necessary electronic data that is
  central to identifying and responding to incidents of fraud.� While companies have spent considerable time adopting and
  amending policies in response to Sarbanes-Oxley, relatively few have
  implemented the information technology infrastructure that will enable
  companies to turn anti-fraud policies into concrete results.�
  This paper addresses the critical importance of internal computer
  investigations as a central component to maintaining adequate corporate
  financial controls under Sarbanes-Oxley, and why companies must establish a
  technical and procedural infrastructure to perform such investigations.�
  The paper also explains the current challenges companies face in
  creating an infrastructure that is adequately equipped to fulfill the intent
  of Sarbanes-Oxley, and the steps companies can take to create an effective and
  compliant infrastructure. 
   
   
	 
   
   
	A major component of
  the Congressional response to “the
  shenanigans . . .that ha[d] been going on in corporate America”
  [vi]
  was to reaffirm the primary responsibility of the Board of Directors and
  senior management for any misstatements in a company’s SEC filings, while
  increasing penalties for securities fraud. [vii]�
  Section 302 of Sarbanes-Oxley broadened the scope of accountability for
  CEOs and CFOs by requiring them to personally “certify their companies’
  financial reports and disclosure controls and procedures, with a potential $5
  million fine and up to 20 years in prison as penalties for violations.” [viii]�
  Section 404 of Sarbanes-Oxley requires companies to institute effective
  “internal controls.”� Importantly, this responsibility encompasses more than mere
  accounting practices.� In June
  2003 the SEC issued its final rules under Section 404 of Sarbanes-Oxley.�
  The SEC noted that “internal control is a broad concept that extends
  beyond the accounting functions of a company.” [ix]�
  Under the SEC’s rules, the
  internal controls process must include policies and procedures that:�
   
   
	Provide reasonable
  assurance regarding prevention or timely detection of unauthorized
  acquisition, use or disposition of the [company’s] assets that could have a
  material effect on the financial statements. [x] 
   
	Section 302 also
  specifically identifies internal fraud as an event that would require
  disclosure by senior management. Put simply, an adequate internal control
  structure must include “controls related to the prevention,
  identification and detection of fraud.” [xi]
  (Emphasis added).� Clearly, then,
  the necessary controls involve much more than proper accounting. Insider
  trading and other internal financial fraud, theft of intellectual property and
  large-scale misappropriation of customer information are incidents that would
  require disclosure.  
   
   
	In fact, in order for a
  CEO or CFO to properly attest that proper internal controls are in place, the
  executive must certify under 302 that he or she has disclosed “any fraud,
  whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have
  a significant role in the issuer’s internal controls.” In addition to
  these 302 requirements, Sarbanes-Oxley places increased responsibility on
  senior management and the Board of Directors for any misstatements in a
  company’s SEC filings. As such, the board and senior management may be
  potentially liable for failing to disclose incidents of internal fraud, such
  as intellectual property theft or misappropriation of customer information.  
   
   
	Sarbanes-Oxley also
  addresses corporate fraud from another direction:�
  by providing protection for employees of public companies who report
  fraud.� Section 806 of
  Sarbanes-Oxley is entitled “Protection for Employees of Publicly Traded
  Companies Who Provide Evidence of Fraud.”�
  The “Whistleblower” protections of Section 806 include protections
  for employees who provide information concerning “any conduct which the
  employee reasonably believes constitutes [fraud, wire fraud, bank
  fraud, or securities fraud], any rule or regulation of the Securities and
  Exchange Commission, or any provision of Federal law relating to fraud against
  shareholders.” [xii]
  (Emphasis added).�  
   
   
	As a result, if the
  employee reasonably believes that fraud is occurring, the reporting of the
  activity is protected, whether or not any fraud is in fact taking place.�
  The protection applies not only when the employee provides information
  to law enforcement, but also where the employee provides information to “a
  person with supervisory authority over the employee (or such other person
  working for the employer who has the authority to investigate, discover, or
  terminate misconduct).” [xiii]
  Thus, Section 806 covers every situation in which an employee reasonably
  believes that wrongdoing is occurring, and reports such alleged wrongdoing to
  the appropriate channels within the company.   
   
   
	The strong protections
  afforded to whistleblowers encourage such reporting without fear of
  retaliation. In turn, companies must thoroughly investigate reports from
  whistleblowers as a control activity. For instance, because senior executives
  must disclose relevant instances of fraud under section 302, the failure to
  diligently act upon reports from whistleblowers would likely violate the
  reporting requirements under 302 as well as the internal controls provisions
  under section 404.� Moreover, if a
  company is convinced that an employee’s reported belief about possible fraud
  is unreasonable, the company nevertheless needs to conduct a thorough
  investigation to support its assessment of the situation.�
  Only then can the company have the confidence to reject a whistleblower
  report as unfounded. 
   
   
	Sarbanes-Oxley also
  directly involves the Board of Directors in setting policy for the handling of
  whistleblower complaints.� Section
  301 of Sarbanes-Oxley requires the Board’s audit committee to “establish
  procedures for (A) the receipt, retention, and treatment of complaints
  received by the issuer regarding accounting, internal accounting controls, or
  auditing matters; and (B) the confidential, anonymous submission by employees
  of the issuer of concerns regarding questionable accounting or auditing
  matters.” [xiv]�
  Thus, as is the case for other provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley, the
  responsibility for the proper treatment of whistleblower complaints is
  squarely placed at the highest levels of each public company. 
   
   
	These and other
  provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley make it essential that companies have the ability
  to respond to allegations of fraud.� According
  to Greg Schaffer, Director of Cybercrime Prevention and Response for
  PriceWaterhouseCoopers, Sarbanes-Oxley’s requirements “are causing many
  public companies to hire investigators, including computer forensic experts,
  far more regularly to review allegations of wrongdoing or indications of
  potential fraudulent activity detected by internal company control structures.
  �Just detecting possible instances of internal fraud is not enough in
  today’s environment; those instances must be properly investigated and
  addressed.” In order to investigate such allegations quickly and
  effectively, whether the investigation is handled internally or outsourced,
  all relevant evidence must be gathered, preserved, and analyzed.�
  For publicly traded companies, this can only be done by ensuring that
  the company has the necessary technology and training to acquire, 
  search and preserve its electronic data. 
   
	Enterprise
  Computer Forensics Required for Effective Internal Investigations
  
	Even prior to
  Sarbanes-Oxley, courts recognized the importance of preserving electronic data
  in connection with litigation, including securities fraud investigations.�
  For example, in In re Bristol-Myers Squibb
  Securities Litigation, [xv]
  the court determined that the discovery of computer evidence was critical to
  ensure a proper investigation of alleged corporate fraud.�
  The court noted that as the vast majority of documentation now exists
  in electronic form, electronic evidence discovery should be considered a
  standard and routine practice going forward. [xvi]�
  The provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley will certainly induce courts and
  auditors to look closely at a company’s ability to forensically preserve and
  analyze electronic data. 
   
   
	Other agencies and
  groups have also adopted standards regarding computer forensics.� The leading international information security best practices
  standard, ISO 17799, calls on enterprises to use computer forensics to
  preserve the admissibility of evidence:�  
   
   
	For information on
  computer media: copies of any removable media, information on hard disks or in
  memory should be taken to ensure availability.�
  The log of all actions during the copying process should be kept . . . [xvii] 
   
   
	The mere focus upon
  computer data, however, is not enough. Computer evidence must be properly
  collected, verified and handled under accepted computer forensic procedures to
  ensure its accuracy and admissibility in court. As recognized by the courts [xviii],
  if a company does not have the tools necessary to collect evidence in a manner
  that preserves its admissibility in court, the inability to prosecute or
  otherwise institute disciplinary action will likely have diminished impact on
  employee behavior, and the company risks compromising its legal (and hence its
  financial) position: 
   
	When an incident is
  first detected, it may not be obvious that it will result in possible court
  action.� Therefore, the danger
  exists that necessary evidence is destroyed accidentally before the
  seriousness of the incident is realized. [xix] 
   
	An enterprise can
  minimize this danger by utilizing the best computer forensics tools available
  for response to security incidents so that collecting data will be quick and
  easy.�  
   
   
	Under Sarbanes-Oxley,
  management is required to include in the company’s annual report an
  assessment of the effectiveness of the company’s relevant internal controls.
  [xx]�
  Thus, at the end of each fiscal year, management must evaluate the
  effectiveness of the company’s internal controls. [xxi]
  This evaluation must be based on a “suitable, recognized control
  framework.” [xxii]
  Although the rules do not mandate the usage of a particular framework, [xxiii]
  the “report of the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway
  Commission (COSO), titled Internal Control - Integrated Framework,
  contains the suitable criteria most commonly used in the United States. [xxiv]�
  In the release issuing the final rules for Section 404, the SEC
  specifically noted that “[t]he COSO Framework satisfies our criteria and may
  be used as an evaluation framework for purposes of management’s annual
  internal control evaluation and disclosure requirements.” [xxv]�
  As a result, at this time nearly all companies subject to
  Sarbanes-Oxley will be using the COSO Framework to evaluate the effectiveness
  of their internal controls. 
   
   
	The COSO Framework
  recognizes that one of the “temptations” for employee fraud is
  “nonexistent or ineffective controls,” as well as “high decentralization
  that . . . reduces the chances of getting caught.” [xxvi]�
  Thus, in order to prevent employee fraud, a company should have in
  place effective controls that increase the likelihood of getting caught. 
   
   
	The ability to identify
  and detect fraud is likewise enhanced by computer forensics. COSO specifically
  recognized the risks of internal fraud:� “Former
  or disgruntled employees can be more of a threat to a system than hackers.” [xxvii]�
  In addressing this risk, a company utilizing the COSO Framework needs
  to deploy a computer investigation framework for effective risk management of
  internal fraud.� Of course, the
  COSO Framework was not addressing computer forensics when it was published in
  1992.� However, COSO recognizes
  that “[i]nternal control systems change over time.” [xxviii]�
  Indeed, “the assessment of risks not only influences the control
  activities, but may also highlight a need to reconsider information and
  communication needs.” [xxix]�
   
   
   
	When assessing a
  company’s ability to gather and access the necessary information regarding
  internal fraud (or any computer security incident), the quality of the
  information is thus paramount.� Only
  an effective computer forensics capability allows a company to gather
  accurate, timely information concerning the incident, and permits the ready
  access to that information.� COSO
  does not itself mandate specific technology infrastructure or software.�
  Instead, it recognizes that the “complexity of an entity, and the
  nature and scope of its activities, affect its control activities.” [xxx]�
  Indeed, the COSO Framework notes, “factors that influence an
  entity’s complexity and therefore, the nature of its controls include:
  location and geographical dispersion, the extensiveness and sophistication of
  operations, and information processing methods.” [xxxi]�
  For many companies, given the breadth of their operations, only an
  enterprise-wide, network-enabled computer forensics capability will satisfy
  the “Information and Communication” aspects of COSO (and, thus,
  Sarbanes-Oxley) with respect to computer security incidents. 
   
   
	Incident
  Response Capability for Rapid Investigations Necessitated By Sarbanes-Oxley 
   
   
	Section 409 of
  Sarbanes-Oxley underscores the fact that the law does not tolerate delay with
  respect to investigations.� Entitled
  “Real Time Issuer Disclosure” Section 409 requires disclosure to the
  public “on a rapid and current basis [any] information concerning material
  changes in the financial condition or operations” of the company. [xxxii]�
  Although the SEC has not yet promulgated regulations under Section 409,
  [xxxiii]
  the statute itself is clear:� each
  reporting company must communicate timely information to the public.�
  In order to do so, a company must effectively and rapidly respond to
  internal incidents (such as financial fraud) and external attacks that can
  have a material effect on the company. 
   
   
	When it comes to
  penalties, Sarbanes-Oxley reserves the most severe sanctions for those guilty
  of destroying records, including electronic data.�
  Under Section 802 of Sarbanes-Oxley, fines of up to $5 million and
  imprisonment of up to twenty years can be imposed upon “[w]hoever knowingly
  alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers up, falsifies, or makes a false
  entry in any record, document, or tangible object with the intent to impede,
  obstruct, or influence” any government investigation or official proceeding.
  [xxxiv]�
  Given the genesis of Sarbanes-Oxley in the Enron/Andersen fiasco, it is
  not surprising that evidence destruction now carries heavy penalties.�
   
   
   
	In order to guard
  against employee malfeasance in the face of a pending or threatened government
  investigation, a company needs to have the ability to preserve potentially
  relevant evidence, and quickly respond to instances of electronic data
  destruction through a network-enabled computer forensics capability. Although
  under Section 802 the employee who destroys evidence would face criminal
  penalties, the company needs to be able to defend itself from claims that the
  employee misconduct was performed with the official sanction of or at the
  direction of management (such as was alleged in the Andersen case). In order
  to do so, the company should have the capability to rapidly and thoroughly
  restore, collect, and preserve the relevant evidence. A network-enabled
  computer forensics capability provides a company with the ability to rapidly
  undelete, analyze, and preserve all of the digital evidence associated with a
  government investigation, thereby blunting any subsequent claim that any
  destruction of evidence by employees was authorized or overseen by management. 
   
   
	Even before the passage
  of Sarbanes-Oxley, the SEC’s official position regarding internal
  investigations was that effective self-policing and cooperation with law
  enforcement could reduce or even eliminate a corporation’s liability for
  violation of the federal securities laws.�
  For instance, the SEC’s investigation into Seaboard Corporation found
  that the controller of one of Seaboard’s divisions had caused Seaboard’s
  books and records to overstate assets and understate expenses, and had
  subsequently actively concealed such misstatements. [xxxv]�
  Although the SEC ordered relief against the controller, it took no
  enforcement action against Seaboard, due to the company’s prompt and
  thorough response to the incident, as well as its cooperation with the SEC. [xxxvi]�
  The SEC noted that the public at large benefits when “businesses seek
  out, self-report and rectify illegal conduct.” [xxxvii]�
  The SEC, in deciding “whether, and how much, to credit self-policing,
  self-reporting, remediation and cooperation,” [xxxviii]
  established four broad measures for it to assess: 
   
 
	
	Indeed, in order to
  cooperate effectively with the SEC and law enforcement, a company must be able
  to “identify . . .� evidence with sufficient precision to facilitate
  prompt enforcement actions against those who violated the law.”  
	[xl]�
  A network-enabled computer forensic capability enables a company to
  capture, preserve, analyze and turn over to investigators all of the available
  digital evidence relevant to an investigation.�
  As a result, this capability enables self-policing, self-reporting, and
  effective cooperation with law enforcement, thereby strongly supporting a
  company facing an SEC investigation. 
   
	Developing
  an Adequate and Compliant IT Infrastructure To Support Internal Investigations
   
   
   
	From the standpoint of
  determining best practices and due diligence for internal investigations,
  computer forensics is a standard practice in enforcement investigations for
  agencies such as the FBI, United States Secret Service and the Securities and
  Exchange Commission. When these agencies investigate public companies,
  collecting and analyzing the computer evidence is central to their efforts.
  Corporations can and should adopt similar internal capabilities for effective
  internal fraud investigations.��  
   
   
	EnCase, [xli]
  developed by Guidance Software, is the leading computer software program
  utilized by law enforcement, regulatory agencies, and corporate computer
  forensic specialists.� EnCase
  Enterprise Edition is specifically designed to provide on-demand
  enterprise-wide incident response and forensic analysis, thus enabling
  immediate, thorough, and non-disruptive computer forensic investigation of
  desktops and servers anywhere on a wide-area-network from a centralized
  location. This powerful capability dramatically facilitates the handling and
  management of internal fraud investigations throughout the organization, which
  greatly facilitates compliance with the internal investigation mandates of
  Sarbanes-Oxley.  
   Conclusion
  
	
	Congress passed
  Sarbanes-Oxley to combat financial crimes and fraud committed by corporate
  insiders. These crimes are compelling internal incidents that warrant
  immediate response and investigation. Network-enabled computer forensics tools
  such as EnCase Enterprise Edition are an ideal methodology for timely
  detecting the “unauthorized acquisition, use or disposition” of company
  assets and provide an important component of an internal framework for
  internal investigations.� Further, a company’s management can feel
  confident that including such tools in its assessment of the company’s
  internal controls will pass muster with regulators, since the SEC and numerous
  other federal agencies use the leading computer forensic software in their own
  internal incidents, as well as enforcement investigations.
  Notes: 
		[i]
      Victor Limongelli is General Counsel of Guidance Software, Inc. 
       
		
		[ii]
      Congress acted “in response to Enron, Global
      Crossing and other bankruptcies.”�
      Representative Oxley,  148 Cong. Rec.
      H5462-02, at *H5462.� See also
      “The events of the past months have underscored the importance of
      transparency in corporate governance. While many believed that Enron was
      an isolated occurrence, the failures of Tyco, Global Crossing, and
      WorldCom have eroded confidence in the markets, both here and overseas”�
      Representative Jones, 148 Cong. Rec. H5462-02, at *H5469. 
       
		
		[iii]
      According to Senator Sarbanes, “[t]he bill sets significantly higher
      standards for corporate responsibility governance.�
      .� . . 
		
		There
      are also extensive criminal penalties contained in this legislation . . .
      These provisions, among other things, require the CEOs and CFOs to certify
      their company's financial statements under penalty of potentially severe
      punishments.”�
      Senator Sarbanes, 148 Cong. Rec. S7350-04, at *S7351.   
       
		
		[iv]
      One of the central themes underlying Sarbanes-Oxley is that public
      companies need to institute and maintain adequate internal controls to
      prevent and timely detect fraudulent activities.�
      Another galvanizing factor was the rampant destruction of computer
      evidence that occurred in the Arthur Andersen/Enron case.�
      See the Arthur Andersen indictment, which alleges that “an
      unparalleled initiative was undertaken to . . . delete computer files”
      available at: 
       
		[v]
      See 
		In
      re Bristol-Myers Squibb Securities Litigation, 205 F.R.D. 437, 440, fn2
      (2002). 
       
		
		[vi]
		
      Representative Bentsen, 148 Cong. Rec. H5462-02,
      at *H5467. 
       
		[vii]
      “Sarbanes-Oxley increased criminal penalties for securities fraud to up
      to 25 years in jail and $2 million in fines.”�
      The Sarbanes-Oxley Act:� The
      First Year, House Committee on Financial Services, at 14. 
       
		[viii]
      The Sarbanes-Oxley Act:� The
      First Year, House Committee on Financial Services, at 5. 
       
		[ix]
      68 FR 36636, 36638, June 18, 2003. 
       
		[x]
      68 FR 36636, 36640, June 18, 2003. 
       
		[xi]
      68 FR 36636, 36643, June 18, 2003. 
       
		[xii]
      18 U.S.C. � 1514A(a)(1). 
       
		[xiii]
      18 U.S.C. � 1514A(a)(1)(C). 
       
		[xiv]
      15 U.S.C. � 78f(m). 
       
		[xv]
      
		205
      F.R.D. 437 (2002) 
       
		[xvi]
      205 F.R.D. at 
		440,
      fn2 
       
		[xvii]
      ISO 17799, � 12.1.7.3. 
       
		
		[xviii]
      State v. Cook, 777 N.E.2d 882, 2002 WL 31045293 (2002 Ohio App.); Gates
      Rubber Co. v. Bando Chemical, Indus., Ltd 167 F.R.D. 90, 112 (D.C. Col.,
      1996)��  
       
		[xix]
      ISO 17799, � 12.1.7.3. 
       
		[xx]
      68 FR 36636, 36642, June 18, 2003. 
       
		[xxi]
      17 CFR � 240.15d-15(c). 
       
		[xxii]
      17 CFR � 240.15d-15(c). 
       
		[xxiii]
      “A suitable framework must: 
       1.������� Be free from bias 
 2.������� Permit reasonably consistent qualitative and quantitative measurements of a company’s internal control; 
 3.������� Be sufficiently complete so as not to omit factors that would alter a conclusion about the effectiveness of a company’s internal control; and 
 4.������� Be relevant to an evaluation of internal control over financial reporting.” The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002:� SEC Issues Final Rules Regarding Internal Control Over Financial Reporting Under Section 404, Cooley Godward LLP, Aug. 4, 2003, at 5. 
 
		
		[xxiv]
      KPMG’s Defining Issues, No. 03-13, June 2003, at 4.   
       
		[xxv]
      68 FR 36636, 36642, June 18, 2003. 
       
		[xxvi]
      COSO Framework, at 25. 
       
		[xxvii]
      COSO Framework, at 53. 
       
		[xxviii]
      COSO Framework, at 69. 
       
		[xxix]
      COSO Framework, at 18. 
       
		[xxx]
      COSO Framework, at 55. 
       
		[xxxi]
      COSO Framework, at 56. 
       
		[xxxii]
      15 U.S.C. � 78m(l). 
       
		[xxxiii]
      As of September 19, 2003, the SEC did not cover Section 409 under its
      “Summary of SEC Actions and SEC Related Provisions Pursuant to the
      Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002”, available at: 
       
		
		http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-89a.htm 
       
		[xxxiv]
      18 U.S.C. � 1519. 
       
		
		[xxxv] In the Matter of Gisela de Leon-Meredith,
      Exchange Act Release No. 44970 (October 23, 2001). 
       
		
		[xxxvi] Exchange Act Release No. 44969 (October 23,
      2001). 
       
		[xxxvii]
      Id. 
       
		[xxxviii]
      Id. 
       
		[xxxix]
      SEC Release 2001-117 (October 23, 2001). 
       
		
		[xl] Exchange Act Release No. 44969 (October 23,
      2001). 
       
		[xli]
      EnCase is a registered trademark of Guidance Software, Inc. 
       
 
  		
		 
		
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